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STATE REGULATION OF
HEALTH FACILITY PLANNING:
THE ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLITICAL
REALITIES OF CERTIFICATES OF NEED
Lauretta Higgins Wolfson*
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the 1960s, federal and state legislators recognized a pattern
of escalating health care costs in this country. Governmental action was
deemed necessary in order to respond to the unique structure of the health
care marketplace. In an attempt to address the rising cost of health care,
laws were passed at both national and state levels with the specific
purpose of controlling costs by regulating supply.2 One specific method
of regulating supply was the enactment of laws which sought to eliminate
the unnecessary duplication and inequitable distribution of health care
facilities and services. Pursuant to these laws, a health care provider
seeking to establish or improve a facility or seeking to provide new or
substantially different services was required to receive government
Lauretta Higgins Wolfson, J.D., L.LM, Assistant State's Attorney, Deputy Sup-rcnizor,
TransactionsfHealth Law Section, Cook County State's Attorney's Office, Chicao, Illinois. The
author thanks Justice Anne M. Burke, Appellate Court of Illinois, for her guidance and inspiration
and the Hon. David A. Erickson, former First Assistant, Cook County State's Attorney's Office,
for his constant support and guidance.
'Patrick John McGinley, Beyond Health Care Rcfori: Rcconsidcring Certificate of Nccd
Laws in a "Managed Competition" System, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 141, 145 (Summ-.r 1995)
(citing Comm. Hosp. of New Port RicheylUniv. Psychiatric Ctr. v. Dept. of HRS, 520 So 2d 604
(Fla 1st DCA 1989)).2See id. at 144.
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authorization before proceeding.3 Theoretically, permission to expand
would not be issued by the appropriate regulating agency unless and until
the agency deternined that community need warranted the expansion.
4
Community need for additional health services was determined by criteria
set forth in individual state statutes.5 A governmental finding of
community need was evidenced by the state issuance of a "certificate of
need" (CON).
Part I of this paper discusses the historical perspective of CON laws,
tracking state and federal action. Part II addresses the workings of the
Illinois health facility planning system. Part III summarizes typical
judicial treatment of Illinois health facility planning agency decisions,
demonstrating judicial deference to state agency findings. Part IV
explores the role of politics in the Illinois health facility planning system,
raising the question of whether political involvement has so tainted the
CON system that it ought to be eliminated. This paper concludes with the
author's comments regarding the future of CON regulations.
PART I: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON
CERTIFICATE OF NEED LAWS
Market Forces and the Health Care Marketplace
Regulators believe state regulation of health facility growth is necessary
in order to control the health care marketplace. 6 Commentators have
argued that institutional health care facilities are economically induced to
manipulate or increase supply by overinvesting in technology, beds and
services without regard to actual need or demand.7 Increased health care
supply encourages increased demand which, in turn, leads to increased
costs. The traditional economic market forces of supply and demand need
governmental intervention due to the unique dynamics of the American
health care system.
For example, a grocery store and a consumer illustrate a classic
3See id. at 145.
4See id. at 144.
5See id. at 145.
6Mark E. Kaplan, Comment: An Economic Analysis of Florida's Hospital Certificate of
Need Program and Recommendations for Change, 19 FL. ST. U. L. Rnv. 475 (Fall 1991).7Id.
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supply and demand marketplace. The grocery store supplies goods in
relation to the demand of the consumer. If the consumer demands more
or better goods, then the grocery store may increase the quantity or quality
of goods so that supply meets demand. If the grocery store increases costs
to the consumer, then the consumer must choose whether to pay the cost
of supply, or reject the cost and take demand elsewhere, perhaps to the
competing grocery store on the other side of town. The consumer's
decision will determine the grocery store's adjustment of supply. As
consumer's demand determines supply, the cost of supply determines
demand. This delicate check and balance is prevalent throughout our
economy.
Conversely, the health care marketplace has a more intricate field of
players and traditional components of this health care field skew the
classic supply and demand dichotomy.8 First, the traditional health care
marketplace has experienced little competition. 9 It is difficult for patients
to hold providers accountable for cost comparisons because of the scarcity
of price information. 10 Second, unlike the consumer expert in food
consumption, the average patient is not equipped for decision-making.
Patients lack the necessary expert knowledge to make informed decisions
about the quality and necessity of health care services; therefore, patients
rely on their physicians to recommend or arrange for these services."1
Unchecked providers and uninformed consumers create demand which
leads to unwarranted and irresponsible supply. Third, health care costs are
primarily paid by third-party payers, usually insurance companies, which
then-pass costs along indirectly by allocating costs to and among all
insureds. This payment arrangement insulates a patient from concern
regarding direct payment for services. Because neither providers nor
patients face direct medical cost payments under this system, only the
insurers have the incentive to control costs.'
2
8Dean M. Harris, State Action Immunity Form Antitrust Law For Public Hospitals: The
Hidden Time Bombfor Health Care Reform, 44 KAN. L. REN. 459,466 n.24 (May 1996) (citing
In re Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361,479 (1985), aT'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7! Cir. 196), cert,
denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).).
91d. at 467.
'See id.
"See id. at 466 n.25 (citing CONGREsSIONAL BLDGET OFIcE, RiSING H-,.LTH CA.RE COST:
CAUSES, IMP1UCATIONS, AND STRATEGIES 9 (1991).).
12Maja Campbell-Eaton, Note, Antitrust and Certificate of Nccd. A Doubtful Prognosis, 69
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The premise that unchecked supply creates unwarranted demand is
a concept historically recognized by the United States Congress as it has
addressed health care issues in the United States. 13 This theory, as argued
by former U. S. Sen. Patrick Moynihan on the floor of Congress, explains
the unnecessary escalation of health care costs in this country:
And it was put to me in terms of that ancient economic
conundrum, if you could use it that way, what is called Says' law
-- a Frenchman named Says -- who propounded in the 18t ,
century that supply creates demand. Now economists have
never, the best I understand, never quite liked that because they
prefer the proposition that demand creates supply. But it noted
that supply creates demand.14
It is important to note, however, that this general premise of supply
creating demand, thereby contributing to needless and escalating health
costs is not supported by conclusive studies. "Although increased
competition ordinarily will reduce prices in most industries, the empirical
evidence is inconclusive as to whether increased competition in the health
care field decreases or increases the prices charged to patients and their
third-party payers. '1 5 In United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.,16
Judge Posner stated,
We would like to see more effort put into studying the actual
effect of concentration on price in the hospital industry as in
other industries. If the government is right in these cases, then,
other things being equal, hospital prices should be higher in
markets with fewer hospitals. This is a studiable hypothesis, by
modem methods of multivariate statistical analysis, and some
studies have been conducted correlating prices and concentration
IOvA L. REv. 1451, 1458 (July 1984).
'
31d. at 1459.
14139 CONG. REC. S2279-01 (1993) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
'
5Harris, supra note 8, at 463 n. 15 (citing Paul A. Pautler & Michael G. Vita, Hospital
Market Structure, Hospital Competition, and Consumer Welfare: What Can the Evidence Tell Us?,
I0 1 CoNTEmp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 117, 118 (1993).).
16898 F.2d 1278 (7thCir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
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in the hospital industry.... Unfortunately, this literature is at an
early and inconclusive stage....'
7
In recent years, Judge Posner's "hospital industry' has become more
competitive.1 8 Today, the growing trend towards managed care has placed
an emphasis on cost containment and has diminished supply to the
displeasure of many patients who wish for untethered consumerism.'
9
This financially conservative trend, however, did not exist post-World
War II at the onset of the hospital boom. To understand the economic
dynamic of today's health care market, it is necessary to examine its
World War II origins.
Post-World War I
During the Great Depression and World War II, the economic realities of
the times affected the availability of health care in the United States.
20
Few American hospitals were built, and many became obsolete.21 Existing
hospitals were unevenly allocated among and within the states.22 By the
mid-1940s, local communities called for hospital development.2
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946,24 also kmowno as
the Hill-Burton Act, was enacted in response to this grassroots
groundswell. The Hill-Burton Act provided federal subsidies to hospitals
that participated in voluntary community planning of hospital expansion.25
The purpose of community planning was to identify, prioritize, and meet
community need.26 Government agencies helped identify and meet the
most urgent health needs, while also curbing a hospital's excess
spending.2 7 However, the Hill-Burton Act had limited impact on health
17Id.
18Harris, supra note 8, at 467.
'
9See id.
2 0McGinley, supra note 1, at 149 (citing S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Secs, 39 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7842, 7859).
21See id.
22See id.
2See id. at 145 (citing Campbell-Eaton, supra note 12, at 1453).24Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946) (codified as 42 US.C. § 24).
25CIark C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by "Ccrtificate of
Need," 59 VA. L. REv. 1143, 1149 (1973), cited in McGinley, supra note 1, at 147.
26See id. at 1149.
27See id.
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facility planning financed by private funding, which was not influenced by
or dependent upon federal subsidies.28 These private entities did not
participate in governmental health facility planning. This pattern of non-
regulated hospital expansion based on private funding limited the
effectiveness of the Hill-Burton Act.29 Federal monetary incentives and
voluntary participation in health facility planning did not cure marketplace
failures.
State Action
Eventually, certain states recognized the need for mandatory governmental
oversight and passed CON laws requiring state regulation of health facility
expansion. In 1964, New York became the first state to require a
governmental finding of community need before a hospital or nursing
home could be constructed.30  By 1968, the American Hospital
Association publicly supported CON laws31 and began lobbying efforts to
encourage the enactment of these laws in every state across the country.
32
Within ten years, thirty-six states had enacted CON laws.33 Ironically,
many of these state laws were brought about by the lobbying efforts of
hospitals, which profited from state regulations and limited access to the
marketplace.
34
Where certificate-of-need laws limit resources effectively, the
owners of existing facilities are in a seller's market. They can
charge inflated prices for their facilities, making it impossible for
[the newcomer] to develop or expand....Certificate-of-need laws
will continue to raise health care costs by restricting the entry of
cost-effective providers into the market.35
28See id. at 1150.29See id.30McGinley, supra note 1, at 147.31See id.32See id.33See id.34See id.35MGinley, supra note 1, at 166.
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The National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1974
In 1974, Congress followed the lead of individual states and enacted the
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act (National
Health Planning Act).3 6 Like state CON laws, the National Health
Planning Act was passed as an effort to avoid duplication of health
services while providing equal access to quality health care.3 7  The
primary purpose of the legislation was to save money by controlling out-
of-control health costs.
38
At the time the National Health Planning Act was being considered,
the health care system in America was in crisis. The consumer price index
was rising annually at 13.7%,39 but medical care prices were rising at a rate
of 16.6% annually.40 More dramatically, hospital charges were rising at
a rate of 18.7% annually.41 "The average cost of a single day in the
hospital rose from nearly $16.00 in 1950, to almost S45.00 in 1965, and
then to about $128.00 in 1974. "42 Congress believed the cause of this
health care cost crisis was the absence of cost containment in the
marketplace.
43
The National Health Planning Act was intended to correct the
marketplace failures and the inequitable distribution of health care
facilities.44 The Senate committee which drafted the National Health
Planning Act discovered that the need for additional hospital facilities,
measured by the need for hospital beds,4 5 had almost disappeared. 46 "As
of 1974, 20,000 beds were unused, labeled as 'surplus' in this country, and
the number of surplus beds was expected to hit 67,000 by 1975." 47 The
36Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975).
37McGinley, supra note 1, at 147.
3'See id. at 147 n.41.
39See id. at 147.40See id. at 149.41See id.42McGinley, supra note 1, at 149.43See id.
"See id. at 150 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300k(a)(3)(B) (2000).).45See id. (explaining that health care planners identify services by referring to the number
of hospital beds available for patient usage).
4See id. (citing S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7842, 7859).
47McGinley, supra note 1, at 150.
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Senate committee reported that "[t]here is convincing evidence from many
sources that overbuilding of facilities has occurred in many areas, and that
maldistribution of high cost services exists.' '48 Regulators believed market
failures49 in the health care industry caused hospitals to overinvest in
unneeded services, thus artificially raising costs.50 The cost of this excess
supply was passed along to third-party purchasers, such as insurance
companies and the government, which ultimately passed this cost along
in higher premiums and other costs to health care consumers. 51 Health care
consumers were overpaying for services because they were required to
compensate for services available but not consumed.
"The Federal Planning Act's legislative history confirms that the Act
was conceived of as creating a planning system to totally displace free
market allocation of resources. ' '52 The Senate Committee Report on the
1974 Act states: "In the view of the Committee the health care industry
does not respond to classic marketplace forces. The highly technical
nature of medical services together with growth of third-party
reimbursement mechanisms act to attenuate the usual forces influencing
the behavior of consumers with respect to personal health services. "53
Free enterprise and supply and demand were not working in the health
care arena.
1979 Amendments
The National Health Planning Act was amended in 1979. According to
the legislative notes, "the critical provision in the 1979 Amendments for
determining Congress's purpose was section 1502(b). 54 This section
contains "extensive findings concerning competitive allocation of
4 8Campbell-Eaton, supra note 12, at 1453.49Kaplan, supra note 6, at 479 (defining a market failure as "some imperfection that causes
a market to operate in other than an economically ideal way, deviating from our notions of how
businesses should react to certain economic conditions").
50See id. at 479 n.28.51McGinley, supra note 1, at 150.
52Judy B. Chase, Case Comment, Antitrust Implications of Health Planning: National
Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 8 AM. J.L, & MED.
321, 334 n.89 (1982).531d. at 334 n.90 (citing S. REP. No. 93-1285, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7842, 7878).
'See id. at 334 n.94 (citing C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY:
PLANNING FOR COMPETITION 125, 143 (1981)).
(Vol. 4:261
STATE REGULATION OF HEALTHFACILITYPLMNNING
resources in the health services industriy The essence of the section is that
health services should be divided into two categories - those for which
competition does and those for which competition does not serve as a
reliable allocation mechanism." 55 "The Senate Committee report on the
1979 Amendments illuminated Congress's intent with respect to the role
of competition in health planning. It revised the above-quoted statement
from the Senate Committee report on the 1974 Act to read: 'The health
care industry has not responded to classic marketplace forces. '" '56
National Planning Act Results
Early governmental studies purported to show success in the reduction of
hospital expenditures.57 Private sector studies, however, did not show the
same result.58 A prominent study of CON effectiveness, published in
1979, found that although the rate of hospital bed growth slowed between
1968 and 1972, the average cost of each patient-day rose. 9 In 1983, the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported that the
country's 1982 medical bill reached $332 billion, which was 10.5% of the
gross national product.60 This figure represented the first time health care
55See id. (citing C. HAVIGHuRST, DEREGULATIG THE HEALTH CkAU INDUSTflV; PL1%NNCG
FOR CoPETImoN 125, 146 (1981) (stating this provision has been codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-
2(b) (1976 & Supp. 111970).)).
Section 300k-2(b) states: (1) The Congress finds that the effect of cornpaition
on decisions of providers respecting the supply of health services and facilities
is diminished. The primary source of the lessening of such effect is the
prevailing methods of paying for health services by public and private health
insurers, particularly for inpatient health services and other institutional health
services. As a result, there is duplication and excess supply of certain health
services and facilities, particularly in the case of inpatient health services.
42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-2(b).
55See id. at 336 n.99 (citing S. REP. No. 96-96 Cong., 1' Sess. 53 (19791, reprinted in C.
HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: PLUN-.r.NG FOR. Co',iPETmio' 125, 148
(1981)).
5Campbell-Eaton, supra note 12, at 1459 n.74 (citing S. REP. No. 96, 96 Cong., 1F Ses.
38, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1306, 1343.
58See id. (citing Blumstein & Sloan, Health Planning and Regulation Tirrzglh Ccritficate
ofNeed: An Overview, UTAH L. REv. 3, 23, 24 (1978)).
59See id. at 1459 (citing D. SALKEVER & T. BIcF, HOSprAL. CERTIITE- F-NEED
Co.mROLs: LmPACTONINVESTMENT, COST, AND USE (1979); F. Sloan & B, Steic.,d, kjcts of
Regulation on Hospital Costs and Input Use, 23 J.L. & ECON. 81, 105 (19S0) (suegesting
regulatory programs did not contain hospital costs during first half of 1970's)).
69See id. at 1451 n. 1 (citing DEs MomNES REG., July 17, 19S3, at 10AI.
2001]
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costs had exceeded 10% of the country's total production. 61
The federal CON law was viewed as a failure, since the law had not
reduced health care costs as expected.62 The cost of American health care
had continued to rise.63 By some calculations, high medical costs were
shown to be especially severe in areas controlled by CON laws.64 "In one
comparison of health care prices and expenses, it was shown that such
prices and expenses [were] actually higher in areas with CON regulations
than they are in areas without CON., 65 Even if measuring the success of
CON laws by the decrease, rather than the total eradication, of health care
inflation, CON laws still caused disappointment, as evidenced by the
constant high percentage held by health care costs in the nation's gross
national product.
66
The result of CON regulation has been debated for years. Many
health care experts have expressed disdain for the CON process: "CON
'has elicited a remarkable evaluative consensus--that it does not work.' 67
Congress, the origin of much CON regulation, has expressed
disappointment in CON results. In the words of U. S. Rep. Thomas
DeLay of Texas:
The Health Planning Amendments of 1985 [and] the National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act required States
to institute certificate-of-need laws providing for review and
approval or disapproval of such proposals if expenditures
exceeded specified limits. Congress intended this review
process to prevent inappropriate investment in the health care
industry and thus keep cost down.
Obviously, the program was not a success. The health systems
agencies, which review proposed investment, are a hindrance to
flexible response by health care providers. The process of
seeking approval from such an agency is burdensome, costly and
61See id.
62McGinley, supra note 1, at 156 (describing the goal of Congress as reduction of health
care costs).
63See id. at 157.
6See id.65See id.66See id.
67McGinley, supra note 1, at 157.
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causes needless delays. As a Texas legislator I worked to
dismantle the Texas Health Facilities Commission. Clearly to
abolish the Federal portion of this flawed program is a positive
step.
68
This view was reinforced by U.S. Rep. David Dreier of California in
remarks inserted into the Congressional Record: "The Certificate of Need
Program is one more example of how stifling Government regulation is
preventing the marketplace from providing badly needed health care
services."
69
Representative Dreier's remarks served as an introduction to the
Congressional testimony of health planning expert Dr. Bedford H. Berrey,
Medical Director, National Alliance of Senior Citizens. Dr. Berrey, a
former Deputy Assistant Chief Medical Director of the Veterans
Administration and former Health Director of the Virginia Department of
Health, has experience in the CON process as both a member of a
governmental entity conducting internal reviews and as a hearing officer.70
Dr. Berrey testified that the CON program actually increased costs by
requiring government approval of provider expansion.71 This increase in
costs, in turn, stifled the flow of resources.72 Dr. Berrey testified that the
CON process is unfair due to the lack of public policy resulting from the
closed nature of the process, the rigid standards, and the program's
limitation to a large-scale protection system.73 Dr. Berrey concluded that
the closed nature74 of the regulated CON process, as well as the rigid
standards and the program's limitation to a large-scale protection system75
led to unfair governmental intervention devoid of public policy.
76
In 1986, the National Health Planning Act was repealed."7 Forty-two
states and the District of Columbia had CON programs when Congress
6'132 Co,,G. REC. 1460 (1986).




73133 CONG. REC. 20105 (1987).
74See Id.75See id.
7 6See id.
77McGinley, supra note 1, at 156.
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repealed federal requirements. 78 Although states were not prohibited from
continuing local CON programs, the federal government would no longer
fund these programs. This decision was due in part to the ".... Reagan
Administration's desire to decrease both federal funding for and regulation
of many government programs and because of the mounting empirical
evidence that CON cost containment objectives were not being realized."7 9
State Repeal of CON Laws
Following the lead of Congress, many states repealed their CON laws.
Since 1983, the repeal of state CON laws includes: Idaho in 1983;
Minnesota and Utah in 1984; Arizona, Kansas, New Mexico, Texas and
Wyoming in 1985; California and Colorado in 1987; South Dakota in
1988; and Ohio in 1995.80
Some commentators contend that these states have experienced a
post-repeal failure to control health care costs: "Those states that
abandoned CON shortly after the federal government removed the
incentives for these programs did seem to experience at least a short-term
increase in investment and some costs."8' CON proponents argue these
states have experienced alarming health facility growth leading to a vast
waste of resources and spiraling costs. On the floor of Congress, U.S.
Rep. Fortney "Pete" Stark spoke in favor of continued state regulation of
capital expenditures, targeting his home state of California as an example
of wasted resources resulting from excess capacity:
California currently has 119 separate cardiovascular surgery
programs. Twenty-five of these were added after the State
abandoned its certificate-of-need [CON] program. One might
inquire that while the post-CON expansion was great, was it
excessive? A clear answer to this question is provided by a quick
[comparison] of Canada and the former West Germany with the
United States. The United State[s] has twice as many open-heart
surgical units per million persons as does Canada and nearly five
times as many as West Germany. And the ratio in California? It
78Kaplan, supra note 6, at 478.
7 9See id.
8 Thaddeus J. Nodzenski, Regulating Managed Care Coverage: A New Direction For
Health-Planning Agencies, 7 ANNALs HEALTH L. 1, 23 (1998).
81Kaplan, supra note 6, at n.8.
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exceeds the national average. The startup costs for each of these
programs are between $6 and $13 million. Annual operating
costs average $7 to $10 million at each location. For each open-
heart surgery center that is not needed and not created, millions
of dollars can be saved each year.82
Illinois and Health Care Facility Planning
Unlike California and other states which have repealed their CON laws,
Illinois has not yet completely repealed its CON laws. In fact, state
regulation of health care planning is currently a volatile issue in Illinois.
This paper will address the workings of the Illinois health facility
planning system and will discuss in particular a case recently before the
Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board: the Case of Proposed Project No.
99-080, The Heart Hospital, as a reflection of state health care planning
across the county. This proposed project represented the cutting edge of
health care planning. It involved a hospital included in the top one percent
of fastest growing hospitals in the United StatesS3 - the only hospital in
the nation's twelfth fastest growing community3 4- and its attempt to
expand by establishing The Heart Hospital. The proposal was met with
loud opposition from other hospitals in the Chicagoland area.
PART H: A CASE STUDY - PROPOSED PROJECT NO. 99-080
THE HEART HOSPITAL
The Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act
Illinois' current CON statutes are known as the Illinois Health Facilities
2139 CONG. REc. H3990-3 (1993).
83Pam Davis, Chief Executive Officer, Eda,,rd Health Service Corp., Transcript of State of
Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board Proceedings, 99-080, January 15, 2000, at 16. "Nap rville
has consistently been listed in the nation's top ten fastest grow'ing communities. This is one of the
reasons why Edward Hospital is among the top 1 percent fastest growing hospitals in the United
States." Id.
14Id. at 11.
"Naperville is the 12P fastest growing city in the United States. The
population of Naperville is also projected to continue to grow at a very rapid
rate, culminating in about 165,000 individuals. Additionally, we are the only
hospital located in this town. And in several of the towns bordering us, there
is also extreme growth with no hospitals in those towns. Plainfield, Lisle,
Bolingbrook, and the Fox Valley area."
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Planning Act (State Planning Act).85 Mirroring the public policy rationale
behind the National Health Planning Act of 1974, the purpose of the State
Planning Act is to address uncontrolled health care costs by limiting
unnecessary growth.
The purpose of this Act is to establish a procedure designed to
reverse the trends of increasing costs of health care resulting
from unnecessary construction or modification of health care
facilities. Such procedure shall represent an attempt by the State
of Illinois to improve the financial ability of the public to obtain
necessary health services, and to establish an orderly and
comprehensive health care delivery system that will guarantee
the availability of quality health care to the general public.86
By limiting unneeded expansion of health care facilities, Illinois
seeks to eliminate the cost of excess services. 87 The State
Planning Act thus attempts to limit health care cost inflation by
prohibiting unnecessary growth. "The Act shall establish a
procedure...that promotes through the process of recognized
local and area vide health facilities planning, the orderly and
economic development of health care facilities in the State of
Illinois that avoids unnecessary duplication of such
facilities;....8
The Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board
The Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board (State Planning Board)
administers the State Planning Act. The composition of the State Planning
Board is mandated by statute:
The State Board shall consist of 15 voting members, including:
8 consumer members; one member representing the commercial
health insurance industry in Illinois; one member representing
proprietary hospitals in Illinois; one member who is actively
engaged in the field of hospital management; one member who
is a professional registered nurse in Illinois; one member who is
8520 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3960 (2000).
8620 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 3960/2 (2000).
88Id.88 Id.
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a physician in active private practice licensed in Illinois to
practice medicine in all of its branches; one member who is
actively engaged in the field of sdlled nursing or intermediate
care facility management; and one member who is actively
engaged in the administration of an ambulatory surgical
treatment center licensed under the Ambulatory Surgical
Treatment Center ActY9
Members of the State Planning Board are appointed by the Governor,
with the advice and consent of the Illinois Senate, and in consideration of
recommendations made by professional organizations."0 Members serve
terms of three years.9' Currently, there is no limit on the number of terms
board members are allowed to serve.9
2
Members of the State Planning Board possess great power. No health
care facility may be constructed, established, or substantially modified in
Illinois without first obtaining a permit or exemption from the State
Planning Board.93 No health care facility may acquire major medical
equipment without permission from the State Planning Board.94 Failure
to obtain a CON permit, or proceeding in non-compliance with an issued
CON permit, may result in penalties, fines, sanctions, or revocation of
permit.95
CON Application No. 99-080: The Heart Hospital
Edward Hospital is located in Naperville, Illinois, a community located
approximately 30 miles west of Chicago. Edward Hospital is an acute
care hospital currently licensed for 124 medical/surgical beds, 7 pediatric
beds, 25 obstetric beds, 15 intensive care beds, and 14 skilled nursing
beds.96 As such, Edward Hospital qualifies under Illinois regulations as a
"general hospital," defined as a "facility which offers an integrated variety
of categories of service and which offers and performs scheduled surgical
S92 0 IL. CohNP. STAT. 396014 (2000).
901d.
91Md.92Id.
9320 ILL. CmiP. STAT. 396015 (2000).94Id.
9520 ILi- COaP. STAT. 3960114 (2000).
96\Vritten Statement to the State Planning Board, 99-0S0, August 24, 1999, at 4 [hvrcinafter
Written Statement to the State Planning Board].
2001]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
procedures on an inpatient basis."97
The city of Naperville is in the midst of a rapidly expanding suburban
area of Chicago, as explained by the president of Naperville Development
Partnership:
The cities of Naperville and Aurora lead the State in residential
growth. These two communities rank among the largest cities in
Illinois, with a combined population of over a quarter of a
million people. Projected growth estimates for Naperville and
the surrounding communities, the total population, at
approximately half a million people by the year 2020[sic]. As an
example, northeastern Illinois in its entirety is expected to grow
in population between 1990 and 2001 at a rate of 24.5 percent,
while the Naperville area is expected to grow at a rate of 76.8
percent, more than triple the northern region as a whole. 98
In June of 1999, a coalition of business entities led by Edward
Hospital99 submitted a CON application to the State Planning Board,
requesting permission for the construction of a for-profit, five-story
"specialty" hospital. 100 Illinois law defines a "special or specialized"
hospital as a "facility which offers, primarily, a special or particular
category of service."'' The proposed five-story facility, devoted
exclusively to cardiac care, would be named Heart Hospital, LLC.10 2
Heart Hospital was originally proposed to have 56 Medical/Surgical beds,
15 Intensive Care beds, 2 Operating Rooms, and 3 Cardiac Catheterization
Labs, as well as Diagnostic Cardiology and Cardiac Rehabilitation
Departments, and 14,410 square feet of leased physicians' offices. 103 The
97ILL. ADM1N. CODE tit. 77 § 1100.220 (2000).
98Christine Jeffreys, President, Naperville Development Partnership, Transcript of State of
Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board Public Hearing, 99-080, August 24, 1999, at 161-62.
99CON Application, 99-080, Heart Hospital, LLC, June 1999, at 3-4 [hereinafter CON
Application]. (The applicants were as follows: Edward Hospital, Edward Cardiovascular Institute,
Heart Hospital, LLC, Edward Health Services Corp. and Physicians, LLC, all entities located at
801 South Washington, Naperville, Illinois. Id.
0'0 A White Paper Opposing the Establishment of the Heart Hospital, LLC, 99-080, August
1999, at I [hereinafter White Paper].
'
01lLL. ADmrN. CODE tit. 77 §1100.220 (2000).
102CON Application, supra note 99, at 2.
'
03See id. at 7, 15.
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estimated project costs were $92,391,587.' 04 The site for Heart Hospital
was proposed as adjacent to Edward Hospital itself.105
Request for Permission to Modernize
Heart Hospital was proposed as a modernization of an existing, licensed
hospital, rather than the establishment of a new hospital. The proposal
called for the modernization of Linden Oaks Hospital, a psychiatric
hospital owned by Edward Health Ventures and located approximately .5
miles from Edward Hospital.106 At the time of the application, Linden
Oaks Hospital (Linden Oaks) was licensed 0 7 for 110 acute mental illness
beds.'0 8 The Heart Hospital application proposed a "modernization"' 169 of
Linden Oaks Hospital by which Heart Hospital would assume the license
of Linden Oaks.
The first step of this modernization plan consisted of discontinuing
the use of 50 psychiatric beds at Linden Oaks, which would have reduced
the psychiatric beds from 110 beds to 60 beds.'" The second step was the
transfer of the remaining 60 psychiatric beds to Edward Hospital."' The
third step involved changing the name of Linden Oaks Hospital to Heart
Hospital 2 and moving Heart Hospital from an area .5 miles from Edward
Hospital to a newly constructed building, physically abutting Edvard
Hospital itself."3 The final step in this modernization plan was the sale
of Edward Hospital's existing not-for-profit Cardiac Catheterization and
Open Heart Surgery Services to the for-profit Heart Hospital.
1 4
As the CON applicant,"' Edward Hospital had the burden of proof
104See id. at 9.
""
5See id. at 2, 5.
105written Statement to the State Planning Board, supra note 96, at 5.
107210 ILL COMP. STAT. 8511 et seq. (2000). Illinois hospitals are regulated, in part, by the
Hospital Licensing Act, which states no hospital may be opened, conducted, oparated or
maintained without first obtaining a license from the Illinois Department of Public Health.
100Vritten Statement to the State Planning Board, supra note 96, at 4.






114CON Application, supra note 99, at 7.
"IILL ADM. CODE tit. 77 § 1180.40(c) (2000). "An applicant is the person required by the
Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act to obtain a permit from the State Board %,ho file an
application vith the State Board."
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on all application issues. 116 This burden included establishing that Heart
Hospital "was consistent with the standards, criteria or plans adopted by
the State Board."' 1 7 For example, Edward Hospital was required to
document that Heart Hospital was the "most effective or least costly
alternative"' 8 and that the project was needed. Proof of need could have
been documented by: area studies evaluating population trends,1
9
"calculation of need based upon models of estimating need for the
service," 120 "historical high utilization of other providers in the area,'
121
and "identification of individuals likely to use the project."' 122 The
applicant was also required to demonstrate that, except for a few
exceptions, 123 the size of the proposed project did not exceed the norms
for projects of this size,124 that the size of the project was appropriate 125
and "that in the second year of operation the annual utilization of the beds
or service will meet or exceed the target utilization."'
126
The Heart Hospital CON application was subject to hearing
requirements in place at the time under the State Planning Act.' 27 Upon
review of an application for permit, an opportunity for a hearing was
provided.'2 8 All hearings were open to the public.' 29 The public hearing
was required to take place within a reasonable time, not to exceed 90 days
after receipt of the application, 130 and notice of opportunity for public
hearing and the opportunity to participate in the public hearing was
afforded to all "affected persons".' 31 A hearing officer, appointed by the
'
16See id. § 1130.130(a).




9See id. § 1110.230(d)(2)(A).
IZ°ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 77 § 11 10.230(d)(2)(B) (2000).
12 1See id. § 1 10.230(d)(2)(C).
122See id. § 11 10.230(d)(2)(D).
"
23See id. § 1110.230(e)(1)(A-D).
'
2 4See id. § 1110.230(e)(1).
'
25lLL. ADM. CODE tit. 77 § 11 10.230(e) (2000).
126See id. § 1110.230(e)(2).
127See id. § 1130.100.
12SSee id. § 1140.20(a).
129See id. § 1180.120(a).
'
3
°ILL ADM. CODE tit. 77 § 1140.20(a) (2000).311Formerly 77 ILL. ADM. CODE § 1200.20(b) (1999). See also former 77 ILL. ADM. CODE
§ 1200.30(c) (1999) (defining "affected persons" as the applicant, as well as the State Health
Planning Development Agency or area wide health planning organization, any contiguous area
wide health planning organizations located in the same Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area that
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State Planning Board, conducted all hearings.'32 Any party to the
proceeding was allowed to appear at the hearing and was allowed
representation by an Ilinois licensed attorney. 133 All parties at the hearing
had the right to give testimony, produce evidence, cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and present arguments.134
The Heart Hospital Public Hearing: August 24, 1999
On August 24, 1999, the State Planning Board conducted a public hearing
on the issue of the Heart Hospital proposal. The hearing officer announced
the purpose of the hearing:
As you know this Public Hearing is held pursuant to the [State
Planning Act] to allow you, the public, an opportunity to present
verbal and/or written testimony...So all we're going to do is be
the conduit to get the information to the [State] Planning
Board.13s...Obviously, we had no idea how many people were
going to show up. I've had none. I've had 10. I've had 50. I've
never had 300 plus, and we're thrilled to have you here.13'
The Heart Hospital Proposal
At the August 1999 public hearing, Heart Hospital proponents presented
arguments supporting the need for expansion to serve the growing
demands of the Naperville community. The sizable increase in population
and hospital staff was not complimented by an equivalent increase in
patient beds. 37 In specific instances, bed shortages forced area hospitals
to hold patients in the emergency department or ambulatory areas until an
inpatient bed became available. 13S The projected increase in the number
of future inpatients would increase the strain of an institution already
might have an interest, and all other persons who are to be served by the project). (Repealcd at 24
Ill. Reg. 6101; effective 4-17-00).
132IIL ADM. CODE tit. 77 § 110.120(c) (2000).
133See id. § 1180.50(a).
1
"Seeid. § 1180.120(f).
135George Stevens, Hearing Officer, Transcript of State of Illinois Health Facilities Planning
Board Public Hearing, 99-080, January 15, 2000, at 8 (copy on file with author).
1361d. at 5.
137Davis, supra note 83, at 15.135See id. at 16.
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stretched beyond capacity.139 The voices of Heart Hospital proponents
were consistent in their message at the public hearing, but theirs were not
the only voices heard that day.
Opposition to Heart Hospital: The Alliance
A group of charitable, not-for-profit hospitals from DuPage, Kane and
Cook Counties (Chicagoland counties) opposed the Heart Hospital CON
Application. This group of hospitals called itself "The Alliance for
Governmental Action" (Alliance) and included Central DuPage Hospital,
Good Samaritan Hospital, Hinsdale Hospital, LaGrange Memorial
Hospital, Loyola University Medical Center, Provena Mercy Center, and
Provena St. Joseph Medical Center. 140 Under Illinois law, members of the
Alliance were allowed to participate in proceedings before the State
Planning Board as "interveners."''
Alliance concerns were voiced at the August 24, 1999 public hearing
and also in the Alliance's "White Paper" brief filed with the State
Planning Board. Alliance opposition to the CON was organized into four
basic allegations: (1) CON deficiencies and inaccuracies; (2) potential
misuse of charitable assets; (3) fraud and abuse and physician self-referral
concerns; and (4) threats to health planning and the orderly delivery of
health care.
14 2
CON Deficiencies and Inaccuracies
The Alliance objected to the CON application as fundamentally
misleading, and argued the Heart Hospital proposal was not a
modernization of an existing hospital at all, but rather, the construction of
a new hospital at a location separate from the Linden Oaks facility. 143 The
Alliance argued that the characterization of this CON proposal as a
139See id. at 12.
140Written Statement to the State Planning Board, supra note 96, at 1.
14'ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 77 § 1180.40(e) (2000) (defining interveners as "adversely affected
persons" granted the right to be parties to proceedings before the State Board. Interveners include:
"(5) health care facilities located in the health service area in which the project is proposed which
provide services similar to the services of the applicant; and/or (6) health care facilities which have
formally indicated an intention to provide similar services in the future.").
142 Written Statement to the State Planning Board, supra note 96, at 1.
1'4 Thomas Fahey, attorney for the Alliance, Transcript of State of Illinois Health Facilities
Planning Board Public Hearing, 99-080, August 24, 1999, at 27.
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"modernization of Linden Oaks" was misleading, as no modernization of
psychiatric services was proposed. 44 Psychiatric services would be
reduced and transferred, not modernized.
145
An argued defect of the CON application involved the issue of
hospital licensing and the proponents' plan for Heart Hospital to inherit
the hospital license of Linden Oaks. Although Linden Oaks had been
operating under a duly granted license, hospital licenses in Illinois are
issued for specific categories of service and a specific number of beds, 14
and are valid only for the premises and persons named in the CON
application. 147 Heart Hospital would be neither a psychiatric hospital, nor
located in the same building as Linden Oaks. a4 The Alliance argued that
a change in the legal identity of a hospital licensee constituted the
establishment of a new hospital 149 contrary to Illinois regulations, which
hold a hospital license is not transferable.'50 The Alliance argued Heart
Hospital should not be allowed to assume the license of Linden Oaks in
an effort to "modernize" that facility into the Heart Hospital.''
Furthermore, the Alliance argued, the proposed reduction in
psychiatric beds was not consistent with a recent, prior representation of
Linden Oaks. In 1998, Linden Oaks had filed a request with the State
Planning Board to increase its mental health service to the community
through the addition of 10 psychiatric beds. 152 Theoretically, this request
was based upon community need for additional services. The State
Planning Board granted the request. After the grant of 10 additional beds,
Linden Oaks made another request of the State Planning Board. On June
11, 1999, Linden Oaks filed a Certificate of Exemption (COE) application
requesting permission to complete a change in ownership of Linden Oaks
to Edward Health Ventures.15 3 The COE application stated in part, "There
will be no changes in bed capacity or scope of services provided at Linden
14Id.
145See id
146\Vhite Paper, supra note 100, at 1.
147210 ILL. Comp. STAT. 8516(a) (2000).
148 white Paper, supra note 100, at 5.
'
49See id. at 1, 9, 10.
150210 ILL. COmp. STAT. 85/6(a) (2000).
5'5 White Paper, supra note 100, at 1.
mlVritten Statement to the State Planning Board, supra note 96, at 2.
'5See id.
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Oaks Hospital as a result of this transaction."' 54 Less than one year after
the State Planning Board responded to the request for additional beds,
Edward Health Ventures, through Edward Hospital, filed the Heart
Hospital CON application, which requested a decrease in psychiatric beds
and cited a decrease of 45% in the community's need for mental health
services.' 55 The Alliance cited the pending CON proposal to reduce
psychiatric services as a clear signal of imminent changes' 56 in psychiatric
care offered to the Edward community in direct contradiction of earlier
representations made to the State Planning Board.
Potential Misuse of Charitable Assets
The Alliance contended that approval of the CON application would usurp
community health dollars, dollars which should be safeguarded by the
State Planning Board. The proposal involved the transfer of cardiac
services from a community not-for-profit entity to a new, for-profit joint
venture. This transfer would draw not-for-profit funds away from a
community hospital while adding no new cardiac services. 157 Heart
Hospital, the Alliance argued, was devoid of community benefit.1
5 8
Edward Hospital is a not-for-profit community hospital.' 59 As a
community hospital, Edward Hospital's assets are community assets that
exist solely for the benefit of the community. 160 All revenues generated
by hospital services are returned to the community through the
subsidization of other health services. 16' These community assets include
the not-for-profit monies generated by most 162 of the cardiac care services
currently in operation at Edward Hospital. If the Heart Hospital were
approved and Edward Hospital's cardiac care services sold, the Alliance
charged, then the not-for-profit Edward Hospital would be, in effect,
subsidizing private physician investment in the for-profit Heart
'5See id. at 11, 16.
'
55See id. at 2.
156 See id.
157 Written Statement to the State Planning Board, supra note 96, at 1.
'
58See id.
IS9See id. at 3.
160See id.
161See id.
162 Written Statement to the State Planning Board, supra note 96, at 3.
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Hospital.1 63 Heart Hospital was projected to lose more than $20 million
in its first three years of operation, which could impact Edward Hospital's
finances. 164
Illinois Attorney General Jim Ryan began evaluating whether Edward
Hospital's not-for-profit hospital's charitable funds should be used toward
the 71-bed for-profit Heart Hospital. 165 Floyd Perkins, an attorney in the
charitable trusts division of Ryan's office, statec "We want to know, from
a financial point of view, whether the venture is fair to the charity, in this
case being (Edward) hospital. ' 166 Perkins further asked: "Should the
charity do it and is it being done at arm's length? Does this make sense
for Edward to be making this kind of arrangement?"
167
To understand the Alliance's argument on this point, it is important
to note the lucrative aspect of cardiac care in relation to other health
services. "General hospitals often derive more than a third of their
margins from cardiology and cardiovascular surgery services, with such
services typically being the most profitable programs a hospital
operates." 168 Revenue generated from cardiology and cardiovascular
surgery services often is applied to other vital but fiscally draining hospital
services, such as trauma services, psychiatric services, and indigent
care. 169 This balancing of profitable and nonprofitable services allows a
not-for-profit to carry out its mission to provide for all those who present
themselves for care, including the medically indigent.
If the CON application were approved, argued the Alliance, then
Edward's cardiac services and the community monies generated by these
services would be sold to the Heart Hospital. 170 Ownership of the cardiac
services would be divided between Edward Hospital, which would hold
50.1% interest, afd private investor/physicians, who would hold 49.9%
interest.171 Thus, Edward Hospital's share of cardiac profits would be
'6See id.





16xWritten Statement to the State Planning Board, supra note 96, at 3.169
see id
17OWhite Paper, supra note 100, at 1, 26; See also Written Statement to the Stale Planning
Board, supra note 96, at 3.
171State Agency Report, Project No. 99-050, Heart Hospital, LLC, at 2 [hereinafter State
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reduced from 100% to 51%.172 And, the 51% of profit share would be for-
profit income instead of not-for-profit monies. 7 3 The remaining 49% of
cardiac care profit, previously a charitable community asset, would be
diverted to private investors/physicians.
174
The proposal affected not only community funds in Naperville, but
in adjoining areas as well. The not-for-profit institutions in the involved
planning areas had invested hundreds of millions of dollars to meet
charitable community health care needs.1 75 These funds, and the resultant
benefit to their communities, were now endangered. The Alliance voiced
the following opposition at the public hearing:
Taking not-for-profit medicine, which has as its foundation,
altruism, that is the interests of communities and patients, and
replacing it with a for-profit health care, the primary purpose of
which is generating earnings for stakeholders is a distortion of
health care, in our opinion, and a potential source of harm to
patients.1
76
This loss in not-for-profit status would cause Medicaid patients and
underinsured patients in the service area to experience a decrease in
cardiac care, particularly in procedures such as bypass surgery,
angioplasty, or angiography. 17
7
Representatives for Alliance Hospital Provena Mercy Center
explained the connection between cardiac services and charitable assets
at the public hearing:
Cardiac services, as you've heard, are the centerpiece of most
hospitals' strategies, a service with very high consumer visibility
and demand, and a main driver of hospitals' profit margins,
Agency Report]; See also White Paper, supra note 100, at 7 and CON Application, supra note 99,
at 7.
'7White Paper, supra note 100, at 26; See also Written Statement to the State Planning
Board, supra note 96, at 3.
17id.
1741d.
175White Paper, supra note 100, at 16.
'"6Dr. Anthony Barbato, President and Chief Executive Officer of Loyola University
Medical Center and Health System, Transcript of State of Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board
Public Hearing, 99-080, August 24, 1999, at 41 (copy on file with author).
177Written Statement to the State Planning Board, supra note 96, at 7.
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whether for-profit or not-for-profit.178
The cardiovascular program at Mercy Center is one of the
hospital's most financially viable programs, and its bottom line
allows Provena Mercy Center to continue its work and its
dedication to the mission. If the volume decreases, as is
anticipated by shift to the new for-profit entity klown as the
Heart Hospital, cost per procedure at Mercy will increase and the
Program will not survive [sic].179
In the past Mercy Center has reduced beds as part of a
CON....180 In the past 24 months alone, Mercy has written off
5.6 million dollars in charity care, in addition to significant
dollars for bad debt."8... Mercy serves a very broad geographic
market, much of which overlaps the market identified in the new
for-profit hospital. 
82
Provena Mercy Center is a longstanding mission-focused
community hospital and it will be put in jeopardy so that the
investors in the new Heart Hospital will benefit financially. That
is unconscionable 1
8 3
Representatives of Loyola University Medical Center summarized the
value of not-for-profit, charitable health care:
The Catholic Church has had a long tradition of delivery of
medical services. We know from principle, as others are learning
from experience, that for-profit hospitals give rise to the question
of whether or not they can deliver quality-appropriate service to
the broad public in need of medical service.18
178Steve Davis, Regional Vice-President of Adventist Health Systems, Transcript of State
of Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board Public Hearing, 99-080, August 24, 1999, at 9S.
-' Mary Sheahen, then-President and Chief Executive Officer of Provena Mercy Center,






'8See id.1 3See id. at 91.
'"Michael Sharon, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Loyola University Medical
Center, reading a letter from the Most Rev. Edward M. Coniay, Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago,
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Some speakers, such as Dr. Austin Gibbons, past President of the
Medical Staff at Alliance Hospital Good Samaritan Hospital, were more
direct: "I see this as a form of skimming which will pose a threat to the
financial underpinning of the not-for-profit hospitals. Dollars which now
help to underwrite charitable care and the treatment of unprofitable
diseases will instead go to investors."'
185
The Alliance argued that Edward Hospital's proposal constituted a
loss of not-for-profit revenue to the community, a loss which should be a
focus of the State Planning Board.1
8 6
Fraud and Abuse and Physician Self-Referral Concerns
The third concern voiced by the Alliance was the impact that Heart
Hospital physician investment and self-referral would have on cardiology
and cardiovascular costs in the community. 87 The CON application
expressed the intent of fourteen cardiologists and cardiovascular surgeons,
allegedly future investors, 8 8 to refer a substantial number of patients to
Heart Hospital. 189 These referrals were to be made regardless of the
physicians' long associations with other area hospitals that had highly
reputable cardiology and cardiovascular surgery programs, 19° hospitals
which would suffer the utilization loss of existing cardiac facilities. Why,
the Alliance argued, had Heart Hospital become the hospital of choice?
What did Heart Hospital offer which the existing community hospitals and
medical centers did not? The answer, according to the Alliance, was the
existence of physician investment and profit.191
Issues regarding physician self-referral have been the subject of
national interest long before the Heart Hospital proposal. In an attempt to
Liaison for Health Affairs, Archdiocese of Chicago, Transcript of State of Illinois Health Facilities
Planning Board Public Hearing, 99-080, August 24, 1999, at 128.85Dr. Austin Gibbons, Immediate Past President of Medical Staff of Good Samaritan
Hospital, Transcript of State of Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board Public Hearing, 99-080,
August 24, 1999, at 113-14.
186Jack Barto, President, Provena Hospitals, Transcript of State of Illinois Health Facilities
Planning Board Public Hearing, 99-080, August 24, 1999, at 172.
87Written Statement to the Planning Board, supra note 96, at 4.
'
88See id. at 4.
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control rising health costs, the Health Care Financing Administration and
the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) implement and enforce
Medicare rules and regulations.1 92 These rules and regulations include the
Anti-Kickback Statutes, Stark I and Stark II, which restrict physicians in
their use and ownership of health care facilities and services. 193 Such
regulations are based on the premise that physician investors who refer
patients for costly services may be swayed from what is best for the
patient's health to what is best for the physician's personal finances,
194
thereby raising health costs unnecessarily.
In a Special Advisory Bulletin of July 7, 1999, the OIG announced
it would be looking closely at physician ownership of specialty hospitals
to determine whether such arrangements are within the Anti-Kickback
guidelines which prohibit physicians from being paid for patient
referrals.19 5 U.S. Rep. Fortney "Pete" Stark, the sponsor of Stark I and II,
believes even if physician ownership of specialty hospitals complies with
the letter of the law, such arrangements violate the spirit of the law.'
9
Stark has stated, "My suspicion is that this is a watered-dovn lawyer's
way to pay doctors kickbacks for the patients they refer."'97 Stark has also
articulated concerns about physician-owned services and has said, "I don't
think the physicians ought to be investing in the hospitals...It troubles me
as a patient, as an individual. I would like for my physician to have no
incentive one way or the other to send me to the hospital or choose which
hospital I go to."19
The Alliance argument raised the distinction between profit and not-
for-profit health care entities: a perceived distinction, real or not, found in
the mission of a hospital and the motivation of physicians. This distinction
was articulated by Patrick Fahey, Chairman, Department of Medicine,
Loyola University Medical Center: "[A] for-profit physician investor
program calls into question the fundamental expectations that patients
192Written Statement to the State Planning Board, supra note 96, at 4 (noting a commitmnt








97Written Statement to the State Planning Board, supra note 96, at 4, 5 (citing to Hospitals
& Health Networks, 72(7); 24-26, 28-30 (April 5, 1998).).
'
98See id. at 5.
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have of their physicians. Patients rely on physicians to always work in
their best interests, independent of the physician's financial investments.
For-profit health care systems have a very, very different motivation."' 99
The Alliance concluded that, "The Edward Heart Hospital places a burden
on physicians that should not exist by making them investors."200
Threats to Health Planning and the
Orderly Delivery of Health Care Services
The final objection levied by the Alliance against the CON application
was the threat to area-wide health planning and "the orderly delivery of
health care services., 20 1 Under Illinois regulations, an applicant proposing
the establishment or expansion of a health facility must document that the
primary purpose of the project will be to provide care to the residents of
the planning area in which the project will be physically located.202 The
applicant must also prove that the location will not create a
maldistribution of beds and services.203
Because some cardiologists and cardiovascular surgeons on staff at
Alliance hospitals were members of physician groups who would be
investing the required 46 million dollar physician share in Heart Hospital,
the Alliance was concerned about the redirection of patients away from
communities already served by Alliance hospitals. 2°4 Such redirection
would have a direct impact on Alliance hospitals. A reduction in the
number of patients at Alliance hospitals would lead to increased costs for
remaining Alliance patients, due to fewer patients being available to
defray cost of cardiology staff, equipment, and facilities. 20 5 As explained
by Jack Barto, President of Provena Hospitals: "The projected volume of
199Patrick Fahey, Chairman, Dept. of Medicine, Loyola University Medical Center,
Transcript of State of Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board Public Hearing, 99-080, August 24,
1999, at 105.20 Dr. Steven Slogoff, Chairman, Dept. of Anesthesiology, Stritch School of Medicine and
Loyola University Medical Center, Chairman of Loyola University Physician Foundation,
Transcript of State of Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board Public Hearing, 99-080, August 24,
1999, at 103.
201Written Statement to the Planning Board, supra note 96, at 5.202ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 77 § 11 10.230(a)(1) (1999).2031d. § 11 10.230(a)(2) (emphasis added).
204David Fox, President of Central DuPage Hospital, Transcript of State of Illinois Health
Facilities Planning Board Public Hearing, 99-080, August 24, 1999, at 77.20
-1d. at 78.
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increased referrals to the Heart Hospital represents projected volume
declines at other area hospitals which could have serious results."26
Redirection would reverse years of successful area-wide health planning
for cardiac services.20 7 The Alliance argued:
These Heart Hospital physicians who will profit by performing
more surgical and invasive procedures at that facility, will be
incented to move patients from existing hospital settings to the
proposed [-]eart [H]ospital. That shift of patients will have
significant impact on several local community hospitals and on
Loyola University Medical Center, not on the basis of improved
services to patient, but, instead, on a new dynamic influencing
patient referral.201
Alliance witnesses described the impact redirection would have on
Alliance hospitals and their ability to care for remaining patients and
argued that the area had ample cardiac services available for the
population.20 9 Alliance members stressed that the endangerment of cardiac
services in other areas was being brought about by greed, not necessity,
and cited several examples where bed need was already being met by
existing cardiac services. 210
In addition to the issue of new beds, the Alliance raised the issue of
new services. According to the Alliance, Heart Hospital mandated great
cost but offered no new services:
None of the services in the new facility offer anything new to the
patients or the community.211
The programs of services described in the Heart Hospital's
application do not differ to any degree from those that already
exist. Actually, what people in our communities are getting are
no new service, but less accessibility and significantly greater
206Barto, supra note 186, at 176.
207Fox, supra note 204, at 79.2OSBarbato, supra note 176, at 41.
2
-
9Dr. Michael Pollsorn, Quality Director, Provena Mercy Center, Transcnpt of State of
Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board Public Hearing, 99-0S0, August 24, 1999, at 167-64321 Barbato, supra note 176, at 45.
21Barto, supra note 186, at 174.
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cost[sic] 212
Alliance speakers were incredulous at what they saw as an enormous
misallocation of health care dollars: "At a time when health care costs
continue to rise, to spend more than 91 million to create an unnecessary
entity is beyond the comprehension of most fiscally responsible health
care executives and physicians. 213
Yet, Alliance officials predicted, an approval of the Heart Hospital
application would create a Pandora's Box of health care planning, as other
hospitals in the area pursued similar proposals in an effort to compete with
a specialty hospital. 4 The threat to the orderly delivery of health care
services would have only just begun.
Responses From Heart Hospital Investors
Heart Hospital proponents also spoke at the August 24, 1999 public
hearing. Dr. Louis McKeever, Chairman of the Board, Midwest Heart
Specialists, a projected Heart Hospital physician/investor, responded to the
Alliance's charge that a for-profit Heart Hospital would practice a lower
standard of care and also detrimentally impact care at Alliance hospitals:
Midwest Heart Specialists has been the leading provider of
cardiology care in DuPage County for over 20 years.... We've
always sought to make all of the institutions that we've been a
part of the best that they can be, and that will not change with
this new proposal....We...do not share the same concerns of the
competing hospitals that you've heard today. In fact, two of the
competing hospitals that have spoken against this are places that
we practice and have a major preference. Our commitment to
them will not change....And yet, we feel that the Heart Hospital
proposal is an idea that is right for our time. It's right for our
patients. And in particular, it's right for the community of
212Jerry Pearson, Interim President of St. Joseph Medical Center, recently retired Chief
Executive Officer of Provena Health, Transcript of State of Illinois Health Facilities Planning
Board Public Hearing, 99-080, August 24, 1999, at 59.
213Sheahen, supra note 179, at 91-92.214Davis, supra note 178, at 99.
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Naperville, given the demographics that you've already been
told.215
Dr. Mark Goodwin, another projected Heart Hospital physician,
responded to the allegation of inappropriate physician self-referral and
health planning:
Our group, Midwest Heart Specialists, has founded a program at
Good Samaritan Hospital and currently is the predominant
provider of care there. So when you hear people talldng about
their wonderful programs, that wonderful program is us....We're
the predominant provider to both Elmhurst and Good Samaritan
Hospital. And a large provider of care at Central DuPage
Hospital and, previously, at Loyola....Our group has served all
these hospitals for the past 25 years, and as of yet, have not, to
this date, moved cases from one site to another. 16
Illinois State Planning Agency Report
After the public hearing, the Heart Hospital CON request, like all CON
applications, was reviewed and evaluated by the State Planning Board
staff for compliance with general review criterion2"17 set out in the Illinois
regulations. 218 The purpose of the criteria and standards is to establish a
basis for evaluating a project.219 Review considerations include (1) cost
effectiveness; ° (2) availability of services; 221 (3) accessibility of services
based on geographic, social, financial and other considerations;=m (4)
quality of services delivered;2 3 (5) needs of the population;224 and (6)
215Dr. Louis McKeever, Chairman of the Board, Midwest Heart Specialists, Transcript of
State of Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board Public Hearing, 99-030, August 24, 1999, at 130.
216Dr. Mark Goodwin, Midwest Heart Specialists, Member of Edward Hospital Board of
Directors, Transcript of State of Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board Public Hearing, 99-030,
August 24, 1999, at 154.
217I1L ADIM. CODE tit. 77 § 1110.30(b) (2000).
215See id. § 1250.110(a).219See id. § 1250.1320(a).
'20 See id. § 1250.1320(a)(1).
2 tSee id. § 1250.1320(a)(2).
=ILL. ADm. CODE tit. 77 § 1250.1320(a)(3) (2000).
=See id. § 1250.1320(a)(4) (noting further that quality is often broken down into three
components: quality of input resources (i.e. certificationltraining of providers); quality ofprazess
of service delivery and quality of outcome of service use (actual improvement in condition or
reduction of harmful effects)).
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financial viability of the health care institution .225 By adhering toestablished, published criteria, the analysis and evaluation of CON
projects is a public and consistent process.
All evidence submitted on an application is considered in the
determination of whether the application is in compliance or
noncompliance with the review criteria.226 The State Planning Agency
staff then issues its findings in a report known as the State Agency Report
(SAP).
State Agency Report Evaluating Heart Hospital
Staff personnel from the State Planning Agency reviewed the Heart
Hospital CON application and issued a SAR. The SAR found the
proposed project did not meet certain criteria.227 Findings of deficiency
in the Heart Hospital CON application echoed Alliance arguments
presented at the August 1999 public hearing. The SAR found a lack of
evidence supporting each of the following criterion: the basis for
discontinuation of mental health services at Linden Oaks; establishment
of mental health services at Edward Hospital; unmet community need for
cardiac services; unmet community need for beds; and economic
feasibility.228 An in-depth discussion of each criterion found unmet is
beyond the scope of this article. However, in order to understand the
CON application process in general, a review of the State Planning
Agency's analysis of some criterion is necessary.
Discontinuation and Establishment of Services Analysis
Based on Edward Hospital's plans to discontinue acute mental illness care
at Linden Oaks, the SAR used a Discontinuation of Services analysis2 29 in
reviewing the Heart Hospital application. However, Edward Hospital had
not seen the proposal as involving a discontinuation of services but, rather,
a transfer and modernization of services.230 The Hospital had argued the
acute mental illness beds and services at Linden Oaks Hospital would be
'
24See id. § 1250.1320(a)(5).
225See id. § 1250.1320(a)(6).
226See id. § 1130.620(d)(4).
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reestablished in a separate building at Edward Hospital, and therefore
would not be discontinued.231 Thus, Edward Hospital had not addressed
discontinuation criteria in the CON application. Edward Hospital's failure
to address the discontinuation of services criterion led to a SAR finding
that the proposal did not appear to be in conformance with this criterion 32
Contrary to the analysis under Discontinuation of Services, the SAR
used Establishment criteria to evaluate Linden Oaks as an existing cardiac
facility, rather than a discontinued mental illness facility. One criterion
applied by the SAR states:
The applicant must document that a minimum of 200 open heart
surgical procedures will be performed during the second year of
operation or that 750 cardiac catheterizations were performed in
the latest 12 months for which data is available. Anticipated
open heart surgical volume must be documented by historical
referral volume of at least 200 patients directly referred
following catheterization at the applicant facility for open heart
surgery for each of the last two years. 3
Because the SAR reviewed the past and current cardiac services at
Linden Oaks, rather than Edward Hospital, and because Linden
Oaks/Heart Hospital had not offered current cardiac catheterization
services, it could not meet the requirements of this section. Therefore, the
SAP found that the proposed project did not appear to be in conformance
with this criterion.23
4
Allocation of Bed Analysis
Consistent with basic CON concerns regarding duplication of services,
bed need is a standard analysis brought to proposals requesting the
establishment or addition of hospital beds. If the regulating entity reviews
the proposal as a request to establish an additional hospital, then the
applicant must also document that access to services will be improved by
the project.3 s Such documentation must consist of proof of one of the
2"2 See id.
232State Agency Report, supra note 171, at 6.
'
23See id. at 10.
2"4See id. at 11.
235ILL ADM. CODE tiL 77 § 11 10.320(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
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following facts: (1) the proposed service is not available within the area;236
(2) existing facilities have restrictive admission policies resulting in access
limitations; 237 (3) existing providers are experiencing occupancy levels
beyond target levels; 238 or (4) the travel time to existing providers is
excessive (exceeds 45 minutes).23 9
If the state agency reviews the request as permission to add beds to
an existing facility, then the applicant must prove the need for additional
beds.240 Proof includes documentation that: (A) existing inpatient beds
over the latest 12 month period have been used at the target occupancy or
higher;241 or (B) when occupancy levels over that period fall below the
target occupancy, affected services cannot be converted to provide needed
bed space. 24
2
Edward Hospital had not addressed this criterion and had asserted
that this criterion was not relevant to the project.243 The SAR, however,
found this criterion was relevant and noted that both Linden Oaks/Heart
Hospital and Edward Hospital were proposing the establishment of one or
more categories of service involving the addition of beds.244 Under the
proposal, Edward Hospital would add acute mental illness beds and
Linden Oaks/Heart Hospital would add intensive care unit and
medical/surgical beds.245 Therefore, the SAR found the proposed project
did not appear to be in conformance with this criterion.2
46
Duplication of Services Analysis
The study of duplication of services and a project's impact on services at
other facilities is a traditional CON analysis. Unnecessary duplication of
open heart services is analyzed by the following criterion:
236See id. § 11 10.320(b)(1).
237See id. § 1110.320(b)(2).
23'See id. § 1110.320(b)(3).
239 ee id. § II 10.320(b)(4).
24 0ILIL ADM. CODE tit. 77 § 11 I0.320(c) (2000).241See id. § 1110.320(c)(1)(A).
242See id. § 11 10.320(c)(1)(B).
243State Agency Report, supra note 171, at 6.
244See id.245 5ee id.
246See id.
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The applicant must document that the volume of any existing
service within 90 minutes travel time from the applicant vill not
be reduced below 350 procedures annually for adults and 75
procedures annually for pediatrics. Documentation will consist
of proof of contact of all facilities within 90 minutes travel time
currently providing open heart surgery to determine the
projected impact the project will have on existing open heart
surgery volume.24
7
Because Edward Hospital had not addressed this Criterion, the SAR found
that the proposed project did not appear to be in conformance with this
regulation.248
Unnecessary duplication of services in cardiac catheterization is
another example of criteria not addressed by the CON application, but
found relevant by the SAR. This criteria states:
Any application proposing to establish cardiac catheterization
services must indicate if it will reduce the volume of em-sting
facilities below 200 catheterizations. Any applicant proposing
the establishment of cardiac catheterization services must contact
all facilities currently providing the service to determine the
impact the project will have on the patient volume as existing
services.
249
The SAR stated Edward Hospital had not addressed this criterion either
and found that the proposed project did not appear to be in conformance
with this regulation criterion. °
In sum, the SAR found that the proposed project did not appear to be
in conformance with 18 criteria. 25
Hearing Before State Planning Board - January 13, 2000
After issuance of the SAR, the State Planning Board convened another
public hearing. At the January 13, 2000 hearing of the State Planning
247See id. at 11.
24 3See id.
249State Agency Report, supra note 171, at 13.
'See id.
'5'See id. at 2.
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Board, Edward representatives responded to the SAR and to concerns of
State Planning Board members: "The negatives that are in the Staff Report
are addressed,... 11 of the 18 as I count them, by our legal theory or our
legal position, and.. .the rest by testimony from our witnesses."
252
Response to Discontinuation and Establishment Analysis
The Heart Hospital proponents argued that the SAR inappropriately used
discontinuation and establishment criteria and ignored the relationship of
the proposed Heart Hospital to its parent corporate entity, Edward Health
Ventures:
Definition of 'existing healthcare facility' requires the State
Planning Board to look at the whole enterprise, not at pieces or
entities that the lawyers might create and might present as partial
pieces of the situation ..... 'Existing healthcare facility' is defined
as 'any healthcare facility or any person or organization that
owns or operates a healthcare facility.'...In this fact situation, it
goes up to EHSC, Edward Health Service Corp., which is the
ultimate parent.25
3
Under this correct interpretation, proponents reasoned, the entire
Edward Hospital campus must be seen as one location.
Notwithstanding this view of the law, the SAR, we think
erroneously, rejects the restructuring within this group as
transfers among, in effect, separate entities. And we don't think
that that squares with your definition in the rules of
modernization, which means, and I'm quoting again,
'modification' of an existing healthcare facility by means of
building, alteration, reconstruction, remodeling, replacement, the
erection of new buildings or the acquisition, alteration, or
replacement of equipment.5 4
The definition of 'establishment' puts you under another set of
criteria, which were the ones that the SAR relied upon. But
52Jeremiah Marsh, counsel for the Edward Group, Transcript of State of Illinois Health
Facilities Planning Board Proceedings, 99-080, January 13, 2000, at 53.2531d
"
254See id. at 12.
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'establishment' means much of these same things on another
site. That's Rule 1130.140. And the key words there are 'on
another site', and we're not on another site. This is all being
done at 80 South Washington, the site that the Edward facilities
exist on.25
Response to Bed Analysis
Heart Hospital proponents responded vigorously to other criteria concerns,
including Bed Analysis Criteria.
We've had patients backlog in our emergency department more
than 40 times in 1999. We've exceeded occupancy to more than
100 percent on 25 days last October alone. We've had
occupancies as high as 128 percent. And in fact, today we have
patients backlogged in our emergency department, and elective
cases have been canceled.z 6
There are other indicators of overcrowding. In fact, a significant
one comes from Dr. John Lumpkin, the Department of Public
Health, in memorandums dated December 29 and January 7. I
quote, 'In response to a significant pattern of hospitals reaching
capacity, exceeding their ability to provide monitored beds in
their intensive care units and other units, and going on bypass,
the Illinois Dept. of Public Health has sought the counsel
involvement of the IHHA and MCHC. These issues have been
an annual concern. They have gotten worse each year. Because
of this, Task Force have been put together in order to help
hospitals deal with overcrowding and try to determine ways not
to go on bypass.' "7
Additionally, a September 1999 memorandum from the Chief of
Staff at Foster G. MeGaw Hospital from Loyola states that
'Loyola Hospital has a bed crunch and requests that physicians
help avoid overcrowding by immediately discharging their
patients.'2's...This congestion does not always show up in
25"See id.
25Davis, supra note 83, at 17.
27TSee id. at 17, 18.25SSee id. at 18.
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occupancy rates, which are averaged over a year'
Response to Duplication of Services Analysis
The Heart Hospital response to the SAR's Duplication of Services analysis
was clear and well-reasoned.
In 1998, Edward performed 325 bypass surgeries out of a total
in our marketplace of 1792. That's a market share of 18 percent.
As seen from the chart, when you take a look at the year 2004,
we are projecting that we will perform 612 bypass surgeries out
of a total of 3,239, at a market share of 19 percent....We are less
than 10% of the total surgeries performed by these existing
institutions now, and in the year 2004, we will continue to be
less than 10 percent of the total number of bypass surgeries
performed by these nine existing institutions. We will not be
hurting these programs. Rather, we will be meeting the needs of
our existing patients and recognizing the growth in aging of the
communities that we currently serve.260
The Heart Hospital forecasts an 88 percent increase in CABG
procedures between 1998 and 2004. This increase is based on
forecasts of growing medical need in the community and does
not assume any cannibalization ..... The Heart Hospital does not
need to cannibalize other facilities to meet its growth target.
61
Board Member Inquiries
During the January public hearing, Board Members expressed frustration
at the proponent's interpretation of underlying data and queried the alleged
improvement in patient care and services to be derived from the 90
million-dollar Heart Hospital. Heart Hospital proponents were asked
these questions and gave this answer:
Q: Dr. Buffalino, would you give a brief summary of how
this is going to improve patient care?
262
2SSee id.(emphasis added).
26OSee id. at 23-24.261Dr. David Dranove of Northwestern University, Transcript of State of Illinois Health
Facilities Planning Board Proceedings, 99-080, January 13, 2000, at 38.262Dr. William Marshall, Planning Board Member, Transcript of State of Illinois Health
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Q: As you're speaking now, Doctor, about quality, just
promise me something, how are you going to measure
that?...You say you are going to do it. How are you
going to measure that?263
Q: How is the new proposed program going to improve that
particular part of your.. .your measurement part?26
Q: I asked - you know, that was a part of my first question
- the targets you set for improvement?
2
,S
Q: Well, see where I'm struggling is,...when I ask, 'Well
what's the next level that you're going to take it to in
terms of quality of care, to kind of pay back the [90]
million dollars?'...In business school, if somebody came
to you..., the board is going to say, 'Show me the
numbers before you get the money.' 
2 0
A: (1)t appears from the forecast that one can justify the
investment purely on the basis of current need and
current quality.
26
At least one Board Member expressed skepticism over Edward
Hospital's continuing refusal to address what the Board considered as
relevant criteria. Yet Edward Hospital continued to assert its ovM
interpretation of required documentation:
Q: Earlier in the testimony was also the need for beds, because
there's people waiting to get in a bed. But when I look at
Mike's report under 'Addition of Beds, Allocation of
Additional Beds', and I get down to the bottom and it says,
'The applicant has chosen not to address this criteria. ' ? 3
Facilities Planning Board Proceedings, 99-OSO, January 13, 2000, at 54.263Id.
26'Richard Wright, State Planning Board Member, Transcript of State of Illinois Health
Facilities Planning Board Proceedings, 99-080, January 13, 2000, at 60, 61.265 d.
265See id. at 77.
26Dranove, supra note 261, at 78.
26
'rhomas Beck, State Planning Board Member, Transcript of State of Illinois Health
Facilities Planning Board Proceedings, 99-080, January 13, 2000, at 67-68.
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A: But the situation is that the reason why those were not
evaluated was because the project was addressed as an
additional bed to Edward's Hospital, which is not what
was proposed. They're proposing to establish those beds
as category of service in another distinctly licensed facility,
and that doesn't work.269
In an effort to sway votes, Board Members themselves engaged in the
art of persuasion. Board Member Stuart Levine, who would ultimately cast
votes in favor of the Heart Hospital CON, stated at the conclusion of the
January hearing:
And, I think, that the reality is that this-this Board has to regard
this project as an existing facility, and not a new facility. And
the fact that this project is being built at the same site is the fact
that there is not establishment of a new facility.
270
This interpretation, however, did not carry the entire State Planning
Board.
State Planning Board Decision
In making its determination whether to approve the Heart Hospital
proposal, the State Planning Board was required to consider the CON
application, the SAR, the public hearing testimony, and any other
information coming before it.271 The approval of an application and the
issuance of a CON requires eight affirmative votes by the State Planning
Board.2 72 The vote taken at the Heart Hospital public hearing on January
13, 2000 found only three votes in favor of the Heart Hospital.273 Because
the application failed to receive the necessary affirmative votes,2 74 the
269Michael Copelin, Healthcare Planning Supervisor, Transcript of State of Illinois Health
Facilities Planning Board Proceedings, 99-080, January 13, 2000, at 68.27 Stuart Levine, Illinois Health Facilities State Planning Board Member, Transcript of State
of Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board Proceedings, 99-080, January 13, 2000, at 78.271ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 77 § 1130.660 (2000).
2721d. (establishing that the failure of an application to meet the review criteria does not
necessarily prohibit the issuance of a permit).
273See id.
274See id. § 1130.670(a).
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State Planning Board voted an Intent-to-Deny the CON application.275
As required under Illinois law,2 76 the Intent-to-Deny gave Edward
Hospital notice of another opportunity to appear before the State Planning
Board and the opportunity to submit additional information in support of
the project 277 Edward Hospital had 30 days27S within receipt of the Notice
of Intent-to-Deny to notify the State Planning Board in vriting whether it
intended to appear before the State Planning Board279 and/or submit
additional information.2 1 If Edward Hospital indicated that no additional
information would be submitted, then the State Planning Board would
take action on the application at its next meeting.2 If the State Planning
Board did not receive a written response within ten days, or if Edward
Hospital waived the right to appear before the State Planning Board, then
the application for permit would have been considered withdrawn.2 2 But
Edward Hospital was not about to give up the fight.
Edward Hospital's Modified Petition
On March 13, 2000, while continuing to defend its original plan,,
3
Edward Hospital submitted a new proposal to the State Planning Board.
In an effort to increase its chances of receiving permission to expand,2 4
Edward Hospital's new plan reduced the scale of its previous proposal by
275IlHinois Health Facilities Planning Board, Transcript of State of Illinois Health Facilites
Planning Board Proceedings, 99-080, January 13, 2000, at S5.
276 720 ILL. COmp. STAT. 3960110 (2000).
277 11- ADM. CODE tit. 77 § 1130.670(a) (2000).
278720 IL. CoMP. STAT. 3960/10 (2000).
279'l. ADM. CODE tit. 77 § 1130.670(b)(1) (2000).
2rSee id. § 1130.670(b)(2).
2alSee id. § I 130.670(c)(2).
282See id. § 1130.670(c)(1).
23PR NEwsWIRm, Edward Health Services Modifies Heart Hospital Proposal in
Preparation For Subsequent State Agenc, Hearing, PR Nwswlas Ass'z , March 13, 2000
(statement of Vincent Bufalino, Medical Director of Cardio-Vascular Services at Edward Hospital)
("The mission of Heart Hospital remains the same...Our original plan was solid, but the Board had
issues about its scope.").
2Bruce Japsen, Edward Hospital Shrinks Heart Plan; 43 Beds, Not 71, For New Factht,
Cm. TaRn., Mar. 14,2000 (Business Section) at 3 (statement of Hospital Spokesman Brian Davis)
("By modifying our proposal, we believe we are giving ourselves a better chance."). See also,
Susan Stevens, Edward Officials Submit Proposal For A Smaller Heart Hospital, Cmt. DALY
HERALD, Mar. 14,2000 (Neighbor Section), at 1 (statement of Ed'ard Hospital Splke--man Brian
Davis) ("We took a hard look at the amount of beds and the cost and decided we'd have a better
chance of getting the concept approved by scaling back.").
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approximately twenty percent.285 The cost reduction in this proposal from
over $90 million to approximately $70 million was based on a number of
things, including the removal of the purchase price of Linden Oaks from
the proposal and a reduction in the original bed request from 71 additional
beds to 43 beds (28 medical/surgical beds and 15 intensive care beds). 2 86
Pamela Meyer Davis, President and CEO of Edward Hospital,
summarized Edward Hospital's view of the second proposal:
With these revisions, we're sending a clear message to [the State
Planning Board] and the Department of Public Health staff that
we've carefully considered, and now have addressed, specific
issues raised at the January meeting....We've been working with
the Department of Public Health staff to better understand their
concerns. We're encouraged by the progress in our discussions
and believe that the changes we've made may satisfy their
concerns.
287
The size of the new proposal was considered "still quite grandiose"288
by the Alliance. Speaking for the Alliance, Thomas Fahey noted, "There's
still an excess capacity of beds in the region."289 Maintaining the
Alliance's objections to the proposal as modified, Mr. Fahey stated, "[The
new proposal] certainly continues to pose a dimension of the project that
is very threatening.:
290
A hearing on the amended proposal was held June 1, 2000, and again
the State Planning Board denied Edward Hospital's request for a Heart




Upon final receipt of the decision of the State Planning Board, Edward
Hospital had further options. Illinois law provides for administrative
26See id.
27PR NEwswvm, supra note 283.288Japsen, supra note 284, at 3.289Stevens, supra note 284, at 1.290Japsen, supra note 284, at 3.291Japsen, Board Again Rejects Heart Hospital, Cmii. Tam., June 2, 2000, (Business
Section), at 1.
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review of decisions of the State Planning Board.292 At the conclusion of
the administrative hearing, a final administrative decision is made, with
findings of fact and conclusions of law.293 Under Illinois law, any person
or entity found adversely affected by the final decision of the State
Planning Board may have the decision judicially reviewed.29' Despite the
expenditure of time, expertise and funds, Edward Hospital did not petition
the state court for review. An understanding of Illinois court decisions
explains why health care entities may be reluctant to do so.
PART III: ILLINOIS STATE COURT
DEFERENCE TO STATE PLANNING
In Illinois, there is virtual judicial abstention from oversight of the State
Planning Board, which results in a grant of great power to the State
Planning Board. A review of typical Illinois decisions shows this to be
true.
In Cathedral Rock of Granite Cit, Inc. v. filinois Health Facilities
Planning Board 95 the State Planning Board granted a CON to defendants
Rosewood and HSM Development, allowing Rosewood to build an SO-
bed, long-term care nursing facility in Granite City. A competing nursing
facility, Cathedral Rock, appealed the decision to the circuit court pursuant
to Section 11 of the Planning Act.296 The circuit court affinned.
There had been great opposition to the plan at the public hearing.
Opponents said the proposed nursing home would take all the private
paying patients, leaving the Medicare patients for other homes in the area,
and that no need for the new home was shown because of the high number
of empty beds in the existing homes.297 The State Agency opposed the
CON, finding three criteria were not met: allocation of additional beds,
location, and alternatives. 298 As the opponents said, Rosewood did not
2220 I-L. CoMP. STAT. 3960/11 (2000).
29 ItL ADm. CODE tit. 77 § 1130.680(c) (1999).
2-9420 ILL COJMP. STAT. 3960111 (2000). See also 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 8513 (1999)
(Hospital Licensing Act).
295720 N.E.2d 1113 (111. App. Ct. 1999).
29'20 I. Comp. STAT. 3690/11 (2000) (incorporating the Administrative Reviev Act).
297 Cathedral Rock, 720 N.E.2d at 1117.21'See id.
2001]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[
prove its project would improve access to the nursing home service. 299
The SAR concluded the additional facility would be an unnecessary
duplication of existing services.
300
Even though the State Planning Agency reviewed and investigated
the application and issued the SAR, the State Planning Board was not
bound by the State Agency's findings. Initially, the State Planning Board
denied approval. 30 1 But the State Planning Board held a second hearing,
where it determined the bed utilization rate based on licensed capacity was
not a true number, and that it should consider the lower number of actual
beds.30 2 The State Planning Board reconsidered its decision and voted to
approve the project.3 3
Upon review, the court held Cathedral Rock, as a competing health
facility, did not have a protectible property interest that was implicated by
the State Planning Board proceeding.3°4 This finding defeated Cathedral's
procedural due process claims arising out of notice and no opportunity to
be heard contentions. That is: "The purpose of the Planning Act and the
public hearing is not to provide protection to competitors from an
imposition on their market shares." 30 5 Rather, "...the purpose of the
Planning Act is to 'establish a procedure designed to reverse the trends of
increasing costs of health care resulting from unnecessary construction or
modifications of health care facilities.' 30 6 While Cathedral had no due
process claim, it could, as a party adversely affected by the State Planning
Board's final decision, seek judicial review under the Administrative
Review Act.
Finally, the court held the State Planning Board's decision was
neither against the manifest weight of the evidence, nor arbitrary and
capricious.307 It was not against the manifest weight of the evidence
because an opposite conclusion was not clearly evident. The court found
sufficient evidence was presented that: the applicant was fit, willing and
299See id.300See id.301See id. at 1118.302Cathedral Rock, 720 N.E.2d at 1118.303See id. at 1119.30°See id. at 1121.305See id.306See id.307Cathedral Rock, 720 N.E.2d at 1124.
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able to provide a proper standard of health care for the community;, the
project was economically feasible; the project was in the public interest;
and the project was consistent with the orderly and economic development
of such facilities and is in accord with the standards promulgated by the
State Planning Board.303 Specifically, the court held failure of the project
to meet one or more review criteria did not bar issuance of a CON.369 The
State Planning Board was free to use its expertise to determine what
information was relevant.
Crystal Lake v. Planning Board,310 an unpublished Rule 23 opinion,
has no precedential value under Illinois law; however, it is instructive in
its discussion of General Review Criteria and economic judgments. The
case involved the State Planning Board's denial of Crystal Lake's request
for a permit to build an ambulatory surgical treatment center.311 The
circuit court, on administrative review, reversed the State Planning Board.
The appellate court reversed the circuit court and affirmed the State
Planning Board.
312
The SAP. had recommended denial and the State Planning Board had
agreed, even after more reports and more hearings. The primary reason
for denial was Crystal Lake's failure to show the facility would generally
result in a substantial cost savings to patients in the planning area.
313
There also were concerns about the project's financial viability.314 The
appellate court held that the administrative decision of the State Planning
Board merited court deference unless its power had been used in an
arbitrary and capricious manner and, finding no evidence of such abuse,
upheld the State Planning Board's decision.
315
The court discussed general review criteria and economic
judgments. 316 It found evidence in the record supporting the State
Planning Board's concern regarding cost savings, specifically, support for
303See id.309See id.31 Crystal Lake Surgical, Ltd. v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board, First Division,
No. 1-95-3271, (Nov. 27, 1996) (unpublished decision of the Illinois Appellate Court under
Supreme Court Rule 23).311See id. at 1.312See id. at 2.3t3See id. at 5.314See id. at 7.315See id. at 11, 22.316See id. at 12-21.
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the State Planning Board's conclusions that Crystal Lake's proposal would
duplicate existing services and cause a negative impact on delivery of low-
cost services in the area.317 Limiting review to the manifest weight of the
evidence, the appellate court would not second-guess the State Planning
Board.3
18
Springwood Associates v. Planning Board319 is one of those rare
cases where the court reverses the State Planning Board by finding the
State Planning Board did not follow its own rules and regulations. The
State Planning Board had approved First CareAmerica's application for
a CON to add 28 skilled nursing beds to its Collinsville Care Center -- a
122-bed skilled nursing facility in Collinsville.320  The challenger,
Springwood Associates, operated the Elmwood Health Care Center in
Maryville. Both were in Madison County.
A public hearing was conducted. Springwood and other competing
facilities claimed the additional beds were not needed because of excess
beds available in surrounding counties.3 21 At the hearing, the State
Agency recommended approval on the basis the proposed project was in
accord with review criteria established by State Agency regulations.
322
The State Planning Board approved the project.323
On administrative review, the circuit court affirmed the State
Planning Board,324 but the appellate court held the State Planning Board's
approval was arbitrary and capricious. 325 The Court found the State
Planning Board's approval was contrary to the State Agency's duly
promulgated regulations. 326 Why? The regulations require "market
studies of the area indicating the characteristics of the population to be
3 17See id.318See id. at 10.319Springwood Associates v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Bd., 646 N.E.2d 1374 (II1.
App. Ct. 1995). One of the regulations relied upon by the court, § I1 10.230(a)(1) has been
amended. See Dimensions Medical Center, Ltd., v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Bd., 697
N.E.2d 1231, 1235, n.1 (1' Dist. 1998). See also Marion Hospital Corp. v. Illinois Health
Facilities Planning Board, 2001 III.App.LEXIS 171 (March 29, 2001).3 201d
3 2 1See id. at 1375.
322See id.
a23See id.324Springwood Associates, 646 N.E.2d at 1375.32SSee id. at 1376.
3 26See id.
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served,' 3 27 and First CareAmerica failed to do that; specifically, First
CareAmerica's application failed to meet the staffing review criterion
required by the regulations. 328 Regulations require letters of verification
from other health facilities and organizations in the area regarding the
supply of manpower, and there was no evidence 20 percent of the area
facilities had been cited for staffing deficiencies over the past two years,
nor was there any documentation that required staffing levels would be
met.
329
There was some evidence on these matters, but the court held the
evidence was not sufficient. The court cited to "the numerous differences
between the documentation required by the regulations and that which the
State Planning Board requested in its application, and upon which its
approval of First CareAmerica's application was based...." 370 Because of
these "differences," the State Planning Board's action was arbitrary and
capricious.
This appears to be a case where the court abandons the usual standard
of review and second-guesses its way to reversal. The court apparently
made up its mind that excess beds were available in surrounding counties;
therefore, the application did not do as the State Planning Act requires.
"The Act establishes a procedure designed to reverse the trends of
increasing costs of health care resulting from unnecessary construction or
modification of health care facilities."
33
'
In Highland Park Convalescent Center v. Planning Board,3 2 the
State Planning Board denied Highland Park's application to build a
nursing home facility in Lake County. The SAR recommended denial.333
After the applicant submitted additional information, the State Planning
Board denied the application.334 Highland Park asked for a hearing. At
the hearing, the hearing officer recommended approval of the application.
Again, the State Planning Board denied it. On administrative review in
327See id.328See id.329Springirood Associates, 646 N.E.2d at 1376.
M3°See id. at 1377.331See id. at 1375.332Highland Park Convalescent Center v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board, 573
N.E.2d 92 (Il1. App. Ct. 1991).3331d. at 93.33See id.
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the circuit court, the denial was affirmed.335
The appellate court affirmed, finding: (1) The State Planning Board
is not required to follow the hearing officer's judgment. It must make its
own decision; (2) The State Planning Board's finding that the proposed
facility would be in an area (Lake County) that already had a significant
number of nursing homes, still leaving other areas of the county
inadequately served, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The proposed nursing home would be a "maldistribution" as that term is
used in the State Planning Board's review criteria; and (3) The State
Planning Board did not use an unpublished rule to deny the application
and therefore did not deny the applicant due process.
336
In Charter Medical of Cook County v. HCA Health Services,337 the
State Planning Board awarded CONs to three applicants who wanted to
build psychiatric hospitals in the same planning area. One of the
successful applicants, Charter Medical, claimed the other two should not
have received the CONs because they would produce more beds than the
projected bed need.3 38 The CONs provided for a total of 280 beds.33 9 The
state bed need for acute mental illness beds in the planning area was
154.340 At a public hearing, Charter asserted that one of the projects failed
to comply with the rule that requires additional or new beds be added to
existing hospitals.
341
The court held that nothing in the rules indicates the State Planning
335See id.336See id. at 94.337Charter Medical of Cook County, Inc. v. Community Psychiatric Centers, Inc., 542
N.E.2d 82 (1. App. Ct. 1989).3381d. at 84.
139See id. at 85.340See id.341See id. at 83.
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Board is without authority to award more beds than the state need. 42 The
State Planning Board has "discretion, judgment, and expertise required for
a balanced consideration of all statutory and regulatory criteria."' 43 The
court stated substantial compliance. The decision was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
It is interesting to compare this case with Springiood. Here, the
State Planning Board did not scrupulously follow the rules and
regulations, but it came close. That was enough for the reviewing court.
Strict compliance was not required.
Conclusions Regarding Court Deference
General conclusions maybe drawn from a reading of Illinois cases:
(1) Because the State Planning Board is made up of people who have
expertise in the area, its factual findings are given great deference by
the courts, yet they are not immune from reversal when a court is
persuaded they are against the manifest weight of the evidence or are
arbitrary or capricious. At the same time, there is no consistent
judicial policy. Some courts hold the State Planning Board strictly to
its rules and regulations, while others require only substantial
compliance and give the State Planning Board a good measure of
discretion.
(2) The courts understand the bottom line is consumer interest. The cost
of health care and the ability to get to it easily are prime factors in
judicial thinking.
(3) The State Planning Board makes independent judgments, and is not
controlled by the Illinois Department of Public Health, SARs, or
hearing officers.
(4) The State Planning Board is willing to change its mind when an
342Charter Medical, 542 N.E.2d at 85.343See id.
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applicant or an opponent offers persuasive additional evidence after a
preliminary finding.
(5) The Planning Act and the State Planning Agency's rules and
regulations create a complex, fact-intensive system for reviewing
applications. It can be a long and costly process, as reports are studied,
experts testify, and lawyers advocate.
PART IV: THE ROLE OF POLITICS
Understanding the great deference granted to the State Planning Board by
the Illinois courts and experiencing the State Planning Board's almost
unlimited power to decide the futures of providers and health care
planning in Illinois, members of the health community have focused
attention on the complex nature of the CON application process.
Hospitals and market players have accused the State Planning Board of
being politically influenced and inconsistent in applying board rules and
suggest the State Planning Board is influenced by lobbyists rather than
health care needs. 3
44
Illinois is not the only CON playing field in which CON approval is
seen as a political battle. This allegation has long been a criticism leveled
in the CON national debate. According to critics, the process of obtaining
a CON has become an enterprise in itself "...becom[ing] so lucrative that
it attract[s] many politicians and former politicians who successfully [use]
their influence to weight the process for those who [employ] their
services." 3
45
The Heart Hospital proposal is an example of the political weight
which can be seen in these cases. Loyola University Medical Center, one
of the Alliance hospitals, hired former Illinois Republican Governor James
Thompson to lobby the State Planning Board, while Edward Hospital
hired former Illinois House Republican leader Sam Vinson.346 At least six
of the fifteen State Planning Board Members have been on the State
344Mary Wisniewski, Proposed Illinois Bill Would Leave Health Board on Borrowed Time,
THE BOND BuYER, Feb. 25, 2000, (The Regions), at 3.345Health Care Services - Certificate of Need Program, 133 CONG. REc. E2919, 100th
Cong. It Sess., Vol. 133, No. 1117 (July 15, 1987) (statement of Bedford H. Berrey, M.D.).346Wisniewski, supra note 344, at 3.
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Planning Board for a decade or more and Board Chair Pam Taylor has
served on the State Planning Board for more than twenty years.
347
Referring to the long service of State Planning Board members, Illinois
State Senator Doris Karpiel stated, "To have members be on the [State
Planning Board] so long and be so political and disregard their own rules
is really a terrible thing for the state because it means a great deal of
money to all of these interests and ultimately to patients."3 ' Additional
concerns expressed by legislators include assertions that: the CON process
is onerous and burdensome 349 (requiring applicants to incur substantial
legal fees in the preparation of any petition); almost all projects are
denied; and the use of expensive consultants is essential to complete an
application.3
50
In response to these legislative inquires, the State Planning Agency
conducted an analysis of calendar year 1997 CON applications in
Illinois351 and issued a report named The State of Illinois Health Facilities
Planning Board Report for Fiscal Year 199832 (Fiscal Report). Rejecting
claims of political considerations within a deliberately complex process,
the Fiscal Report contends that the State Planning Board's goal is the
approval of 100% of CON applications tendered. 53 According to the
Fiscal Report, approximately 88% of all CON applications were approved
upon initial consideration and 96% of all applications were eventually
approved.3 4
3 7Japsen, Proposal Would Limit Terms of Health Board, C Tm., Feb. 22, 2000,
(Business Section), at 4.34SM.
349State of Illinois, Health Facilities Planning Board, Report for Fiscal Year 199S, April
1999, at 4 [hereinafter 1998 Fiscal Report].
35Old.
35
'See id. at 5.
352See id.
353See id
3541998 Fiscal Report, supra note 349, at 5.
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TABLE A: Summary of Planning Board Actions

































Addressing criticism regarding the cost of applications and outside
experts, the Fiscal Report found outcomes for CON applicants "were
virtually identical" for applications that were prepared by health facility
in-house counsel and those prepared by outside consultants. 356
Additionally, "there was no indication" that the 74% of projects which
used consulting services received more favorable consideration than
projects which did not use consultants. 357 Notably, "[o]f applications
receiving an intent to deny, 25% did not use consultants while 75% did
use consultants." 35
8
Arguing on behalf of the effectiveness of the Illinois CON program,
the Fiscal Report notes "the State Planning Board has disallowed nearly
$1 billion in proposed capital expenditures since [fiscal year 1992],"
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health care consumer.359 Comparing Illinois to states where CON laws
have been repealed, the Fiscal Report indicates that "states which have
abolished CON programs experienced substantial development or
expansion of facilities and services with no assurance or evidence that cost
containment, quality of care, and access to services has been
maintained." 3
60
Despite the efforts of the State Planning Agency, the controversy
regarding the role and power of State Planning Board members led to
legislative action. Illinois Senate Bill 807 is an example of many bills
which were introduced in the Illinois General Assembly in recent years
which sought to amend the State Planning Act, thereby decreasing the
power of the State Planning Board.361 Where other bills failed, however,
Senate Bill 807 succeeded. The Bill, as introduced by Sen. Karpiel on
February 24, 1999, was designed to limit the number of terms State
Planning Board members may serve, and to limit State Planning Board
review to projects of $2.7 million or more.362 In February 2000, Senate
Bill 807 was amended by the Senate Executive Committee.3 63 One
amendment limited State Planning Board review to clinical projects only,
thus eliminating the requirement of State Planning Board approval for
non-clinical developments, such as hospital parking lots. -" Another
amendment raised the threshold of State Planning Board approval to
projects estimated to cost $7 million or more, far more than the original
bill adjustment of $2.7 million.365 A third amendment clarified the status
of State Planning Board members as governmental officials accountable
to the public under ethics regulations, including the Open Meetings Act3r
(requiring, with exceptions, public notice and public access to all meetings
at which official business is discussed) and the State Gift Ban Act 7
(restricting contributions and gifts to public officials). Most importantly,
3,9199S Fiscal Report, supra note 349, at 5.
"
6OSee id.36
'See 1999 S.B. 1342, 1999 S.B. 1278, 1999 H.B. 1284, 1999 H.B. 733, 1999 H.B. 427,
1997 S.B. 1830, 1997 H.B. 3402, 1997 H.B. 1269, 1995 S.B. 1544 and 1995 H.B. 2632.
36Wisniewski, supra note 344, at 3.
3632000 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 91-782 (West).
3 Id.
3651d
3655 IL. COwp. STAT. 120/1, et seq. (2000).
3675 L. COMP. STAT. 425/1, et seq. (2000).
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Senate Bill 807 included a sunset provision to eliminate the State Planning
Board completely by July 1, 2003 unless additional legislative action is
taken before that date.368 Thomas Schafer, a spokesman for the Illinois
Department of Public Health, which opposed the bill, stated: "We believe
[the State Planning Board] [provides] oversight to the health care industry
and helps control costs."369 State Planning Board Member William
Marovitz spoke on behalf of the necessity of a regulatory agency. "I think
health care costs will escalate. People are going to rue the day. The
power of hospitals is getting out of hand.,
370
Legislators did not find these statements persuasive. On February 25,
2000, Senate Bill 807 passed the Illinois Senate and was sent to the
Illinois House of Representatives for consideration371 where it was passed
with amendment by the House and returned to the Senate for
concurrence. 372 The Senate concurred in the House amendments and
passed Bill 807 on April 12, 2000.373 Bill 807 was signed by Illinois
Governor George Ryan on June 9, 2000. 374 In anticipation of legislative
review of the sunset provision and the continuing controversy regarding
state regulation of health facility planning, the CON debate rages on.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF CONS
An analysis of CON theory and practices clearly shows that important
public health decisions are being made by an entrenched group of men and
women, virtually unknown and accountable to no one. The necessity of
state health facility planning is being questioned nationally. Regardless
of its eventual outcome, the Heart Hospital battle in Illinois demonstrates
a need for change.
First, states which have CON laws must immediately conduct studies
analyzing the premise that CON laws control rising health costs, prevent
unnecessary duplication of services, and allocate beds and services
36sWisniewski, supra note 344, at 3.369See id.370Bruce Japson and Christi Parsons, Curbs Gain on Heath Planning Board, CM. TRIS.,
Apr. 13, 2000, (Business Section), at 1, 3.
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equitably. Hard data must replace general public policy theory and
anecdotal evidence. Only current and thorough data can respond to the
argument that the historical basis for CONs no longer exists in the new
world of managed care and cost consciousness.
Second, if CON procedures continue, these procedures must be
limited in scope to health facility actions of some relevance and significant
cost. Ordinary, non-clinical modifications such as expansion of health
facility parking lots and renovation of hospital cafeterias should be outside
the control of state regulation, regardless of cost. Additionally, the CON
process must be limited to actions of some financial magnitude, taking
into account today's health care economy, with thresholds or minimums
adjusted yearly according to inflation.
Third, CON procedures must be streamlined and clarified to make the
process more open and fair. A governmental administrative procedure
which is so complicated that it requires an expertise exercised by only a
few legal specialists in a state cannot hope to survive allegations of
cronyism and unfairness.
Finally, the political process of representation and lobbying must be
limited in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Whether real or
imagined, the appearance of secret deals, hidden agendas, and undue
influence corrupts public confidence in the governmental system. Once
a state agency loses the confidence of the public and, particularly, the
health care entities it seeks to regulate, it cannot serve the public interest.
2001]
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